This essay agrees with the conclusion that public opinion succeeded in bringing about a major shift in the American policy in the crisis. However, it argues, the crisis has far greater significance than has been hitherto understood for U.S. China policy as well as strategic policy. The initial American force dispositions and war plans, and the very real possibility that a Chinese escalation of the crisis would have left the United States no choice but to use atomic weapons, made the risk of a nuclear war very high. By exposing the disadvantages of U.S. reliance on nuclear deterrence and emphasizing the need for conventional forces to deal with situations short of total war, this paper argues, this episode highlighted the flaws of the New Look national security policy of the Eisenhower administration. The evidence available so far suggests that China did not plan an invasion of the offshore islands and that the Chinese decision to deescalate was not in response to U.S. deterrence signals. This episode, therefore, cannot be treated as a case of American deterrence of a Chinese invasion. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles played the key role in the administration's handling of the crisis. Above all, the crisis highlighted the folly of letting the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek determine U.S. policy on the basis of Nationalist priorities. As a consequence, U.S. policy toward East Asia underwent a major change. The United States began to distance itself publicly from Chiang's ambitions for a return to the Chinese mainland. Washington also prevailed on Chiang to formally renounce the use of force in his plans for returning to the mainland. The threat to the PRC from its southern flank thus ended for the first time since its birth. By transforming the U.S.-ROC equation, this crisis ultimately worked to China's advantage.
The trap in which the United States found itself in the fall of 1958 was largely of its own making. By the time the first crisis in this area ended in April 1955,' the views underpinning U.S. policy in the crisis,
